


Article

# Preserving Digital Privacy in e-Participation Environments: Towards GDPR Compliance

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**Abstract:** The application of the GDPR 2016/679/EC, the Regulation for the protection of personal data, is a challenge and must be seen as an opportunity for the redesign of the systems that are used for the processing of personal data. An unexplored area where systems are used to collect and process personal data is the e-Participation environment. The latest generations of such environments refer to sociotechnical systems based on the exploitation of the increasing use of Social Media, by using them as valuable tools, able to provide answers and decision support in public policy formulation. This work aims at the analysis of such systems, by exploring the level of the satisfaction of the privacy requirements that GDPR imposes, contributing to the identification of challenges that e-participation approaches impose with regard to privacy protection.

**Keywords:** General Data Protection Regulation; e-Participation; crowdsourcing methods; privacy requirements; privacy enhancing technologies

## 1. Introduction

With the emergence of the Information Society, information has been transformed into a valuable asset and its management into a core economic activity [1]. At the same time, the administration of information gave rise to conflicts between its management bodies and exposed risks regarding individuals' rights, preservation of privacy and protection of personal data [1,2]. Such risks do not arise from external phenomena, but from human decisions and actions [3] related to the management and use of information according to the apparent interests of social groups, governments, businesses and individuals. Internet, as a leading technological infrastructure, has supported the realisation of a new field of communication between social entities, in the context of private life. The exponentially increasing use of the Internet and a variety of novel services based on it, especially social media, has gradually led to their adoption in areas of public life, such as politics. Digital channels of communication have introduced a new form of political interaction that seems to be of particular importance in restoring public confidence in politics and institutions that represent it. In an e-democracy environment, e-participation paradigm consists a key component, as it is the means to adapt government decisions to the real needs and expectations of citizens [4–6]. Thus, the almost continuous presence of people on social networks, through smart phones and tablets, consists a formidable chance for government entities to frequently collect opinions, preferences, evaluations, also considering that the demand of participation of citizens to the government has dramatically increased. Above all, however, the Internet and social media are important tools in decision making when designing public policies, supporting new models of interaction between governments, businesses,

32 citizens and experts, such as crowdsourcing [7], in the context of the need to tackle complex issues  
33 effectively in modern democratic societies.

34 Although Internet-mediated and social media interaction opens up new avenues of collaboration,  
35 it simultaneously generates new privacy and data protection risks, as often, users have zero or limited  
36 awareness of their personal disclosure risks. At the same time, they seem to be complacent by  
37 expressing implicit trust in the providers of services they use, in government and legislation, believing  
38 that they will protect them from the unlawful use of their personal data.

39 In the context of the Information Society, that recognises information as a source of knowledge  
40 and scope, but without the fact that the rights of information subjects are effectively guaranteed,  
41 the terms of privacy are again argued upon on a worldwide level and the right to privacy emerges  
42 as one of the most endangered [8]. Privacy is not considered as a new social issue, but it has been  
43 redefined as a topic within the Information Society since the “classical” concept of privacy has been  
44 significantly enriched [9,10], while its scope fluctuates significantly within various socio-cultural  
45 systems [11,12]. In addition, in post-modern society, the demarcation between the private and public  
46 sectors has become vaguer as the relationships between different information management bodies  
47 have become complex [13,14]. Privacy preservation has been recognised as a key principle in all  
48 modern democracies [15] and this preservation has been documented as a prerequisite for ensuring a  
49 sustainable development of our digital age [2,16].

50 Privacy, in the well-known advocacy of American judges S. Warren and L. Brandeis [17], was  
51 defined as “the right to be let alone”. According to [18] it is the right of individuals to determine what  
52 information is accessible, to whom and when, while [19] is concerned with the selective control of  
53 individuals of access to them by others, thus constituting a dynamic process of setting boundaries  
54 in the context of social interactions. Data subjects often believe they can control the data they  
55 disclose, thereby protecting their privacy. However, this proves to be incorrect, as privacy is not  
56 controlled by individuals but by organisations that own and manage information [20]. In fact, the  
57 potential for privacy violations has greatly expanded due to the social media platforms [21] and the  
58 development of online participation methods. In this work the issue of privacy protection is being  
59 examined, in the context of actions being triggered by governments and public bodies in the context  
60 of e-participation, and in particular on crowdsourcing environments, applying new collaborative  
61 models, which obviously bring multiple benefits when developing public policies, ensuring that  
62 privacy requirements are met [22] and even by default [23].

63 The regulatory framework for privacy preservation is multidimensional. Although general  
64 principles of privacy have long been in place, states often have a different starting point for legal  
65 culture, making interpretations of privacy more and more indistinct [24]. In this context, the recently  
66 implemented General Data Protection Regulation (2016/697/EU) in the European Union is expected  
67 to make a positive contribution, ensuring a “consistent and homogeneous application of the rules for the  
68 protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal  
69 data should be ensured throughout the Union” (Recital 10, GDPR). Although privacy preservation is  
70 legally enshrined and theoretically self-evident in any form of modern democratic social practice [25],  
71 a multitude of incidents have been made public, such as the Snowden case or the notorious scandal of  
72 Cambridge Analytica, and others have not been made public. There are incidents, including a large  
73 number of affected individuals while others are limited. All these recorded incidents confirm that  
74 governments, organisations and businesses collect personal data, often without the knowledge of  
75 the data subjects, without disclosing the reasons for the collection to third parties or their retention  
76 period. At the same time, data subjects, although often voluntarily providing their personal data  
77 or conscientiously consenting to their collection, at a later time express concern or anxiety about  
78 protecting their privacy.

79 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the challenges that have arisen  
80 after GDPR came to existence. In this section we provide an overview of the readiness level of the  
81 organisations that process EU citizens’ personal data. Section 3 presents the methodology that we

82 develop and follow in a project regarding the compliance of an organisation with the GDPR. Section 4  
83 gives an overview of the e-Participation methods and the challenges that this domain faces regarding  
84 the protection of the personal identifiable information (PII) being exposed. Section 5 applies the  
85 proposed methodology into the e-Participation methods domain, in order to recognise the PII that are  
86 published in various platforms, to identify the privacy requirements that have to be satisfied in such  
87 environments, and using this information, to further conduct the required analysis. Finally, Section 6  
88 concludes the paper by raising issues for further research.

## 89 2. Protection of personal data in the GDPR era

90 General Data Protection Regulation (hereafter, GDPR or Regulation) [26] entered into force in  
91 May 2018 aiming at the enhancement of user data protection. Despite that GDPR leads towards a  
92 radical change with many benefits for the individuals that provide their personal data in order to  
93 utilise a service, it turned out to be a significant challenge. Organisations that process personal data  
94 have to conduct long and complex changes for the personal data processing activities to become GDPR  
95 compliant. On the other hand, individuals, as data subjects, are empowered with new rights, of which  
96 they have to become aware and realise their importance in order to be able to exercise them. Finally,  
97 the role of data protection authorities changes along with their expectations from organisations.

98 The application of the GDPR entitled EU regulators to enforce momentous transformation on the  
99 way organisations process personal data of individuals. These changes were expected to have a positive  
100 impact on the latter. However, GDPR has turned into a significant challenge for organisations, which  
101 are enforced to conduct a series of adjustments, shifts and changes on their information technologies,  
102 their business processes, their culture, and on the way they operate overall. Some of these challenges  
103 have been documented by organisations, academic papers or by European Commission reports,  
104 shedding light on the particular aspects of the GDPR that appear troublesome, as we analyse below.

105 The first official report regarding the implementation of the GDPR, provided by the European  
106 Data Protection Board [27] indicates that most organisations have put a lot of effort towards GDPR  
107 compliance, by increasing their financial budget allocated to personal data protection (30% - 50%),  
108 increasing the personnel allocated, while the authorities from 31 member states have dealt with  
109 a total of 206.326 legal cases related with complaints, data breaches, etc. A report by ISACA [28]  
110 presents research indicating that approximately 65% of organisations reported that they were not  
111 ready in terms of GDPR compliance in May 2018. The same report elaborates on technical, regulatory  
112 and legislative tools that should be implemented to assist organisations in their compliance efforts.  
113 In the same direction, Thomson Reuters [29] reports that organisations are still not ready in terms  
114 of GDPR compliance, many of them know very little about the Regulation and are still not fully  
115 aware of the GDPR's potential impact not being ready for the GDPR compliance. In a survey [30]  
116 conducted among privacy experts published by the International Association of Privacy Professionals  
117 (IAPP) in 2019, reported that less than 50% of respondents mentioned they are fully compliant with  
118 GDPR. Interestingly, nearly 20% of the privacy professionals who participated argues that full GDPR  
119 compliance is truly impossible.

120 However, after the enforcement of the GDPR, to the best of our knowledge, there is no recorded  
121 study regarding the readiness of the e-Participation platforms with regard to the requirements of  
122 the Regulation. There are only a few papers that deal with privacy problems in e-Participation  
123 methods. The authors in [31] brought together researchers from the crowdsourcing field and the  
124 human computation field, and among others, they raised issues related to privacy requirements in  
125 such environments, such as the preservation of anonymity. In [32] the authors focused on a privacy  
126 problem related with task instances in crowdsourcing. Next, the authors in [33] focus on privacy  
127 issues related with workers in crowdsourcing environments and they propose a crowdsourcing quality  
128 control method in order to estimate reliable provided results from low-quality ones. Our study  
129 provides a holistic approach of privacy preservation in e-Participation environments, by analysing the  
130 corresponding methods and identifying, through the PII that are provided by the users, the privacy

131 requirements that are compromised, providing also appropriate implementation techniques, following  
 132 the PDCA model of a GDPR compliance project.

### 133 3. General Data Protection Regulation as a project

134 The current state, as the aforementioned analysis revealed, indicates the necessity for organisations  
 135 that process personal data to systematically work in order to align their activities according to the  
 136 requirements of the European Regulation. The compliance of an organisation with the GDPR can be  
 137 seen as a project [34] that follows the fundamental steps of the Deming Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA)  
 138 model [35]. The proposed approach for implementing a data protection compliance project is based on  
 139 the guidelines of ISO standards ([36–38]) and on the recently released [39] which focuses on privacy  
 140 information management, and on best practices published in various ISO standards ([36,37,40–43])  
 141 and various guidelines ([44,45]). For entities that process personal data (i.e. data controllers or data  
 142 processors) the enforcement of GDPR requires the implementation of both technical and organisational  
 143 measures, such as the appointment of Data Protection Officers, when necessary, the deployment  
 144 of tools that allow demonstration of GDPR compliance, the conduction of data protection impact  
 145 assessments, the training of staff, the implementation of data de-identification techniques, to name a  
 146 few. All these actions towards the compliance of the Regulation have been emerged in the general  
 147 PDCA model, which is divided in four phases and each phase has between two and seven steps. The  
 148 proposed methodology is summarised in Figure 1 and analysed below. It is worth noting that each  
 149 step is not presented in detail because they are specific for each project, depending mostly on the under  
 150 examination organisation's context. Moreover, many processes might be iterative, because of the need  
 151 for progressive development throughout the implementation project; for instance communication,  
 152 training activities, or corrective actions.




Figure 1. PDCA model of a GDPR compliance project

- 153 1. **Plan:** Practically, in this first step, we have the initiation of the project, which has the commitment  
 154 of the management, being supported by the organisation as a whole. During this phase, the  
 155 objectives of the project are set, as well as the identification of the corresponding employees that  
 156 will be involved in the process is being conducted. This phase also contains the analysis of the  
 157 existing system/systems, the identification of the organisation structure, as well as the mapping  
 158 of the data the organisation processes in order to be able to conduct data classification. Next,  
 159 the elicitation of the privacy requirements is conducted, since, according to ISO 27014:21013 [38],  
 160 the desired state of an organisation *requires compliance with legislation, regulations and contracts*, i.e.  
 161 external requirements. Since the following step is the gap analysis in relation to the requirements

of the Regulation, this has to be conducted based on the above *desired state*. Consequently, the elicitation of privacy requirements is mandatory in order to be able to proceed with the gap analysis and the data protection impact assessment that follow. Below, the steps of mapping of data processing activities, the gap analysis and the DPIA are analysed in detail:

- *Mapping of data processing activities*: This step aims at the depiction of the current status of the organisation regarding the personal data that it keeps. More specifically, this process starts with the identification of the various processing activities. These might be related with the administration of the organisation, the management of the users, the management of the customers, the human resources management, the sales, the procurement, the technical support, to name a few. In this initial phase, we should identify the role of the organisation regarding each process, i.e. acting as a data controller or as a data processor. According to the Greek Data Protection Authority<sup>1</sup>, for each processing activity, the following data should be provided:
  - (a) Basic characteristics of the processing: i) processing activity, ii) association with the file of joint controllers (if any), iii) categories of the data subjects, iv) categories of personal data being kept for each category of data subjects, v) sources of the data, vi) categories of the recipients, vii) retention period for each type of data.
  - (b) Data related to the data processors: i) contact details of data processors, ii) provision of the corresponding contract.
  - (c) Transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations: i) third country (outside EU), ii) legal basis, iii) provision of information regarding the level of protection of data.
  - (d) Technical and organisational measures: i) physical or electronic means of retention of personal data, ii) general description of technical and organisational security measures, iii) association with the file of analytical description of applied security controls.
  - (e) Lawfulness of processing: i) legal basis of processing personal data (according to Art.6 of the GDPR), ii) legitimate interests, iii) legal basis of processing special categories of personal data.
  - (f) Other information: i) Proof of provision of consent by the data subjects (as soon as the consent is the basis for the lawfulness of processing), ii) rights of data subjects being provided by the controller, iii) existence of automated individual decision-making, including profiling.
- *Elicitation of privacy requirements*: The vulnerability of information privacy has increased due to the intrusion of social media platforms [21] and the intensive development of new e-Participation methods on top of these. To a large extent, the raw material for most of interactions of individuals, with others, with well-established communities and with governmental authorities, include personal data of individuals. Alongside the benefits for the governmental decision making processes, which have been described in Section III, these developments are accompanied with privacy risks that can have negative impact on users' participation [46]. In view of the above, the GDPR is especially well timed. The basis for this study is the fundamental privacy requirements, as they have been defined and identified by the consensus of the literature of the area [43,47–49], namely, authentication, authorisation, anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability.
- *Gap analysis in relation to the requirements of the GDPR*: In this step the gap analysis for the organisation is presented, in relation to the requirements of the GDPR. In particular, compliance is examined per GDPR article, taking into account the required data protection policies, documentation, security measures, etc. the organisation has already implemented. The status of the compliance activities for each compliance requirement can be described using the following scale:

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.dpa.gr/>



- 211 (a) Implemented (highlighted with green colour): The organisation has taken all necessary  
 212 steps to meet a specific compliance requirement.  
 213 (b) In progress (highlighted with orange colour): The organisation has taken part of the  
 214 necessary steps to meet a specific compliance requirement.  
 215 (c) Not applicable (highlighted with grey colour): The organisation is not obliged to meet  
 216 a specific compliance requirement.  
 217 (d) Not implemented (highlighted with red colour): The organisation has not taken any  
 218 of the necessary steps to meet a specific compliance requirement.

219 The gap analysis is repeated for each organisation's processing activity.  
 220 ● *Data protection impact assessment*: In order for an organisation to be compliant with the GDPR,  
 221 they may need to conduct a data protection impact assessment (GDPR, Article 35) to extend  
 222 the implemented countermeasures in a way that can demonstrate the appropriateness of  
 223 the measures taken for each processing activity. Global platforms must assess the risks of  
 224 individuals' fundamental rights and interests as part of the data protection impact assessment,  
 225 in particular, when systematically monitoring users or using artificial intelligence algorithms  
 226 and other new technologies, evaluating individuals or processing sensitive data at a large  
 227 scale. Specifically, an organisation may be required to carry out an assessment of the impact  
 228 of their processing activities in order to protect personal data during its processing, as well as  
 229 to protect computer or other supporting resources that support processing. To this end, this  
 230 step of the Plan phase aims to conduct a data protection impact assessment which is a risk  
 231 assessment related to the impact that business operations or technologies associated with the  
 232 processing of personal data, may have. According to Article 35 of the GDPR, data protection  
 233 impact assessment is conducted when particular types of processing is likely to result in  
 234 a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. In order for an organisation to  
 235 satisfy the requirement for data protection impact assessment, the core actions they have  
 236 to follow are i) to create a list of classified corporate information - including personal data,  
 237 and ii) to implement an appropriate methodology, and to establish policies and procedures  
 238 for carrying out an impact assessment. In the literature there are quite a few risk analysis  
 239 methodologies [50–52], however, Working Party 29 has released criteria for acceptable data  
 240 protection impact assessment [44] that an organisation can follow, where they also suggest  
 241 EU generic frameworks as well as sector-specific ones.

- 242 2. **Do**: This step allows the plan set up in the previous step to be carried out. It includes the design  
 243 of the necessary controls and procedures as well as their implementation. The documentation  
 244 of key processes and security controls is also included in this step. Documentation facilitates  
 245 the management of the aforementioned processes and controls, and it varies depending on the  
 246 type, the size and the complexity of the organisation, their IS any other technologies available, as  
 247 well as the requirements of the stakeholders and the relevant third parties (customers, suppliers).  
 248 Furthermore, this step contains the establishment of a communication plan, as well as the set  
 249 up of awareness and training sessions for the employees of the organisation. In particular, the  
 250 step *Action plan for the conformance of the organisation with the GDPR* takes into consideration the  
 251 outcomes of the previous steps namely *mapping of data processing activities*, *gap analysis in relation to*  
 252 *the requirements of the GDPR*, and *data protection impact assessment* in order for the analyst to capture  
 253 the appropriate technical and organisational controls appropriate for the under examination  
 254 organisation. More specifically, the plan for the recommended actions related to the personal  
 255 data processing is presented. Recommendations and guidelines should also be provided for  
 256 choosing the appropriate controls for mitigating the risks identified from the data protection  
 257 impact assessment step. In addition, suggestions for a long-term compliance strategy and ongoing  
 258 improvement of the under examination organisation, regarding its compliance with the GDPR,  
 259 are also provided.
- 260 3. **Check**: This step consists of two concrete actions. The first action contains the monitoring,  
 261 measurement, analysis and evaluation of the process. In order to be sure that the suggested  
 262 controls, set up in the second step, are implemented efficiently, the organisation shall determine

263 the controls that need to be measured and monitored, focusing on the activities that are linked  
264 to the organisation's critical processes. The second action refers to the internal audit that the  
265 organisation shall conduct. The objectives of the audit should be focused on the evaluation of the  
266 actions related with the GDPR requirements been implemented in the organisation.

267 4. **Act:** The final step of the process aims at maintaining the results of the project and identification of  
268 corrective action processes as well as the continuous improvement of the established framework.  
269 The corrective actions procedure is realised through the following steps:

- 270 ● Identification of the non-conformity and analysis of its impacts on the organisation.
- 271 ● Analysis of the situation, i.e. analysis of the root causes, assessment of the available options,  
272 selection of the most appropriate solution(s).
- 273 ● Corrective actions, by implementing the chosen solutions and recording the actions taken.
- 274 ● Continuous improvement, by evaluating and reviewing the actions taken.

#### 275 4. e-Participation methods

276 Although the emergence of e-Participation is dated back to early 2000s as "the use of information  
277 and communication technologies to broaden and deepen political participation by enabling citizens to  
278 connect with one another and with their elected representatives" [53], a new stream of research  
279 challenges has recently emerged in the field, due to the advent of the new privacy protection  
280 regulations, described in the previous section. The e-Participation paradigm consists of a multitude of  
281 methods of participation in the democratic process, ranging from the simplest information provision  
282 by governmental bodies through open data platforms with the aim of enhancing transparency, to  
283 the straightforward measurement of public opinion through e-voting and e-polling systems. The  
284 most common form of e-Participation is the organisation of complex virtual, small and large-group  
285 discussions, allowing reflection and consideration of issues in e-Consultation platforms, discussion  
286 forums, allowing stakeholders to contribute their opinions on specific policy topics. Advanced  
287 deliberation tools also exist in order to target the discourse to specific public issues, such as spatial  
288 and urban planning [54]. Using GIS tools to support e-participation or participatory budgeting [55],  
289 allowing citizens to identify, discuss and prioritise public spending. Other e-Participation methods  
290 include collaboration environments, empowering individuals to shape and build communities,  
291 electronic surveying, electioneering and campaigning, that enable election campaigns, protesting,  
292 lobbying, petitioning and other forms of collective action, as per the categorisation within the  
293 DEMO-net project' [56]. In all of these various forms of civic engagement, users may consciously  
294 or unconsciously reveal different kind of personal/sensitive data, depending on the institutional  
295 framework of their operation thus imposing risks in their privacy preservation.

296 The first generation of e-Participation is characterised by dedicated platforms for public  
297 consultations were used, owned and controlled by government agencies, which are responsible for the  
298 data processing/storing [57,58], known mainly as electronic forums. However, the next generation  
299 of e-Participation, which entails the use of Web 2.0 and Social Media [59], brings plethora of content  
300 generated by a variety type of users (including citizens, experts, governmental agencies) and new  
301 forms of social interactions, thus diverse types of information disclosure. Moreover, in this Social Web  
302 enabled interaction, public participation is enabled through the utilisation of third-party applications,  
303 whose owners become the data controllers. In these paradigms, citizens may express political opinions,  
304 sentiments or stances against policy measures and prospective policies, even in general political beliefs.  
305 All the above constitute factors increasing the complexity of privacy requirements.

306 Since its advent, methods for enabling and supporting e-Participation, have been also evolved,  
307 such as open innovation, social innovation, co-creation and crowdsourcing paradigms [60,61]. Such  
308 paradigms are used for mining ideas and knowledge from citizens concerning possible solutions to  
309 social needs and policy related problems, for co-designing public sector innovations and for fostering  
310 collaboration between social actors [62–64]. Therefore, the interaction data collected undergoes various  
311 types of advanced processing (e.g., access analytics, opinion mining, simulation modelling) in order to  
312 extract synthetic conclusions from them and provide substantial support to government policy makers.

313 Three paradigms of crowdsourcing are analysed in [7] in terms of privacy preservation. Active  
314 crowdsourcing is based on a centralised automated publishing of policy-related content on multiple  
315 social media. The citizens are able to access this content, view it and interact with it through the  
316 capabilities offered by each of these social media. Then, data on citizens' interaction with them (e.g.,  
317 views, comments, ratings, votes, etc.) are monitored and collected using the application programming  
318 interfaces (APIs) of the targeted social media. Part of this citizens-generated content is numeric (e.g.,  
319 numbers of views, likes, retweets, comments, etc., or ratings), so it can be used for the calculation  
320 of various analytics following Social Media Monitoring practices. Furthermore, a large part of this  
321 content is in textual form, so opinion mining methods are also applied. On the other hand, in the  
322 paradigm of passive crowdsourcing, a set of tools for searching and analysing public policy related  
323 content that has been generated by citizens in numerous "external social media" (i.e. not belonging to  
324 government, such as various political blogs, fora, Facebook and Twitter accounts, etc.), people may be  
325 unaware of the purpose of processing their contributions. This paradigm also provides advanced tools  
326 for analysing this content in order to identify specific issues, ideas, concerns and other information  
327 hidden within the text of citizens' posting on the web [65].

328 It is evident that e-Participation produces large quantities of textual and non-textual contributions  
329 concerning policies and decisions under discussion. Yet, a considerable variety of underpinning  
330 technologies and tools are involved in order to address the overload of information produced by  
331 public participation methods. Data mining and analysis (including sentiment classification, argument  
332 extraction, topic identification), information visualisation and visual analytics are some of the methods  
333 utilised complementary to e-Participation initiatives in order to help the constructive extraction and  
334 aggregation of information and its transformation to useful insights within the decision-making  
335 process. These ICT tools performing data processing oriented towards the collection and integration of  
336 public opinions and values in the democratic decision-making processes, bring another dimension in  
337 the investigation of privacy requirements.

338 The research contributes to the identification of challenges that e-participation approaches impose  
339 with regard to privacy protection and especially on the compliance of these methods with the GDPR.

## 340 5. Applying PDCA model for GDPR compliance to e-Participation methods

341 Based on the analysis conducted in Sections 3 and 4, it appears that the e-Participation methods  
342 are an unexplored area regarding the preservation of privacy of the participants (i.e. data subjects), and  
343 thus, it is of utmost importance to set the foundation towards the compliance of such domain with the  
344 requirements of the GDPR. This section describes in detail the solid steps that an organisation needs to  
345 follow in order to deliver a compliant with the GDPR e-Participation service to citizens, taking care for  
346 the protection of their personal data being exposed to the public. To delimit the research scope, we  
347 focus on the crowdsourcing methods described in the previous section, as the most challenging ones  
348 in terms of data processing. The method that we propose to apply in the crowdsourcing paradigms is  
349 the one presented in Section 3, i.e. the PDCA model for GDPR compliance.

### 350 Stage 1: Plan

351 1. *GDPR project initiation*: When a GDPR project start, it is important for the participants to realise the  
352 benefits that the organisation gains. Specifically, the involved stakeholders should understand  
353 why the organisation's mission, objectives and values should be strategically aligned with  
354 data protection objectives. It is necessary to obtain an overview of the under examination  
355 organisation to understand the security challenges and the risk inherent in that market segment.  
356 E-participation initiatives are carried out mostly, by public institutions (at local, national or  
357 EU level) [55,66,67], and in some cases by civil society organisations and policy makers, such  
358 as MEPs [68]. Therefore the same principles apply, as within any GDPR compliance project  
359 they undergo, and therefore listing the implementation of e-Participation projects in their data  
360 processing activities is necessary. General information about the organisation should be collected  
361 in order to better appreciate its mission, strategies, main purpose, values, etc. Regardless of the



362 type of the e-participation carrier , the development of democracy and civic engagement shall be  
363 one of its strategic objectives. This helps ensure consistency and alignment between the strategic  
364 objectives for risk management and the organisation's mission.

365 The objectives of a GDPR compliance project are to indicate the intent of the public organisation  
366 to treat the risks identified and / or to comply with requirements of the Regulation. Initially, it  
367 is necessary to establish the objectives of a GDPR compliance project in consultation with the  
368 interested parties, such as other policy stakeholders, governmental and regulatory bodies.

369 2. *Commitment of the organisation:* When a GDPR compliance project starts, the higher management  
370 has to approve it and to communicate it to the lower levels of the organisation. The  
371 communication chain and commitment has to span the governmental structure and follow  
372 any bureaucratic processes established. Such a programme requires a lot of effort, both when the  
373 project starts, and when the analysis will have been completed and the results will have to be  
374 put in place. In the beginning of such a project, the employees should provide to the analysts the  
375 required information, since they are the ones who deeply know the processes and the data they  
376 handle. In the case of e-Participation activities, usually dedicated teams consisting of members  
377 of the public institution or inter-organisational committees are formed to carry out the activity.  
378 The commitment of the organisation and public servants is also required after the analysis will  
379 be completed and new measures, technical or organisational ones, will have to be applied in  
380 order to protect the personal data that the organisation processes.

381 3. *Organisation structure:* One of the most important elements in defining the GDPR compliance and  
382 its governance is the hierarchical setting in the organisation of the Data Protection Officer (DPO).  
383 Before the definition of the structure, the management of the organisation should consider  
384 factors such are its mission, potential business implications, organisational and functional  
385 structure, external entities (e.g., other public organisations, citizens or businesses acting as  
386 service consumers, suppliers), as well as the internal culture. The governance structure for data  
387 protection that will be developed should meet the following requirements: i) absence of conflicts,  
388 ii) strong support from senior management or upper governance level, iii) high influence ability,  
389 iv) integration of security concerns. Finally, the activities related to processing of personal data  
390 should be coordinated by a person in charge of information security and data protection, who  
391 establishes cooperation and collaboration with other departments of the organisation or other  
392 collaborating organisations.

393 4. *Mapping of data processing activities:* According to Article 30 of the GDPR, the data controller is  
394 obliged to demonstrate that the processing operations they are performing are in accordance with  
395 the requirements of the GDPR. To this end, organisations performing e-Participation initiatives  
396 should maintain a record of processing activities under its responsibility.

397 Table 1 summarises the data being processed in the area of e-Participation methods, taking as  
398 example the crowdsourcing paradigms discussed in the previous section. s shown, the purpose  
399 of the three forms of crowdsourcing likewise any e-Participation activity is to increase public  
400 engagement. However, there are cases that the initiatives are carried as piloting activities as part  
401 of research projects. Depending on their scope and if organised by international organisations,  
402 third countries can be involved. As identified in the assessment of the different methods,  
403 categories of personal data being processed are defined by the Social Media platform used by  
404 the citizens to contribute and which of them are then are collected to estimate public opinion  
405 [7]. The most prominent data input in all e-Participation generations are comments provided by  
406 the participants to the platforms, either these are electronic forums, consultations tools or social  
407 media. This increases the complexity of GDPR compliance projects, since textual contributions  
408 can reveal sensitive data of the data subject, such as political opinions and orientation, attitude  
409 against the policy under discussion, or profiling of voters. According to their privacy policy,  
410 Social Media can reveal additional personal data such as demographics.

411 The active crowdsourcing method relies on requests of users to provide content, while the passive  
 412 crowdsourcing and the passive expert-sourcing do not require from individuals to create new  
 413 content, instead they conduct selective passive crowdsourcing. This constitutes feasible for the  
 414 authors of the content in the active crowdsourcing to be aware of the processing taking place.  
 415 Regarding the passive approaches, any data that data subjects decide to disclose publicly in Social  
 416 Media (i.e. without any restrictions on access rights to specific groups of people) might subject  
 417 to processing without users being informed. Therefore legitimate crowdsourcing applications  
 418 should acquire users' consent via the Social Media, with which citizens interact.

419 In the case of active crowdsourcing, apart from citizens acting as Social Media users, also policy  
 420 makers contribute (as they are the initiators of posts and provide content on a policy topic in  
 421 order to stimulate the discussion). Processing of data is carried out by the Social Media platforms,  
 422 but also third party applications are used for advanced data analysis, while the results are  
 423 transmitted to the decision makers.

**Table 1.** Processing activities of e-Participation methods

Processing activity	Active Crowdsourcing	Passive crowdsourcing	Passive Expert-sourcing
<b>Purpose of processing</b>	i) Public Engagement, ii) Research Purposes		
<b>Legal basis for processing</b>	User Consent to the data privacy policy of the SM platform (Terms and Conditions)		
<b>Third countries</b>	According to the scope of the e-Participation initiative		
<b>Data source</b>	Data Subject		
<b>Personal categories data</b>	<b>Personal Data:</b> Social media users personal data provided to the SM platform (first name, last name, date of birth – age, gender, email address, login email, occupation), country (the ones submitting comments), social media user ID, Photos, social media activity (likes, retweets) <b>Sensitive Data:</b> Political opinions	<b>Personal Data:</b> Social media users personal data provided to the SM platform (first name, last name, social media user ID), comments, social media activity (in terms of frequency comments posted in SM/activity logs) <b>Sensitive Data:</b> Profiling data (personality-attitude towards)	<b>Personal Data:</b> Social media users personal data (first name, last name, email address, login email, educational Level, job title, organisation, position, professional experience, topics of expertise/ specialisation, CVs), photos <b>Sensitive Data:</b> Political opinions, profiling data (personality-attitude towards)
<b>Data subjects</b>	Citizens/Social Media Users, Policy Makers	Citizens/Social Media Users	Experts, Social Media Users
<b>Receivers</b>	Policy Makers, Public/Governmental organisations		
<b>Processing application IT</b>	Social Media platform, Third party applications		

424 5. *Elicitation of privacy requirements:* Since the mapping of the personal data being processed  
 425 in e-Participation environments has been recorded, the organisation has to proceed with the  
 426 privacy requirements elicitation, taking into account the environment of the under examination  
 427 organisation. For capturing the ecosystem created between the policy makers and the citizens,  
 428 we used Secure Tropos methodology [69] from the security requirements area, which has been  
 429 extended [70,71] to meet the privacy requirements as well. Figure 2 illustrates the analysis of  
 430 a crowdsourcing environment, where each component of the crowdsourcing ecosystem (cyber,  
 431 physical, human) is represented as an *actor*, which has some *strategic goals* (aims or functionalities),  
 432 relevant *plans* (tasks) for achieving those goals, and, finally, a set of *assets* (resources) required  
 433 for carrying out the plans. Additionally, each actor may have a number of *dependencies* for  
 434 goals/tasks that cannot achieve on their own. After we have captured all the dependencies  
 435 between the two actors, according to Secure Tropos modelling language, we are able to elicit

436 the security and privacy requirements (in our work we focus only on privacy requirements  
 437 elicitation) of the system, which are presented as *constraints*, which restrict the various goals and  
 438 plans that each actor has.

439 Focusing on the crowdsourcing environment, a Policy Maker (actor) aims to analyse citizens' data  
 440 in order to shape their policies. This functionality cannot be supported independently, but  
 441 requires input from Citizens (actor). This input refers to the citizens' PII and their political opinions  
 442 (resources), and this interaction is modelled as a dependency between the policy maker and  
 443 the citizen. As we discussed in Section 3, the e-Participation methods are assessed against the  
 444 list of seven privacy requirements, i.e. authentication, authorisation, anonymity, pseudonymity,  
 445 unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability. In our example here, the requirements (constraints)  
 446 that restrict the PII of citizens, being at risk at certain circumstances are anonymity, unlinkability,  
 447 undetectability and unobservability [7].




Figure 2. Crowdsourcing environment analysis

448 Based on the above privacy requirements elicitation process, we proceed with the analysis of the  
 449 three different e-participation methods. The requirements "authentication" and "authorisation"  
 450 are inherited by the privacy specifications of the Social media platforms and Web 2.0 sources,  
 451 where users contribute with content only after they are registered and authenticated. Such  
 452 platforms embed appropriate security mechanisms aiming to control access only by authorised  
 453 users, therefore both authentication and authorisation are safeguarded in all methods. For this  
 454 reason, the three approaches collect solely data that are open to the public. With respect to  
 455 the reservation of the rest requirements in the two crowdsourcing approaches, a distinction  
 456 among the concept of citizen-sourcing and expert-sourcing has to be made. The two first  
 457 citizen-sourcing methods process only aggregated data resulting to automatically generated  
 458 summaries. Although the results do not compromise the identity of authors, as discussed before  
 459 it is possible that textual content (e.g., comments) may include sensitive information, concerning  
 460 the name, demographics or the beliefs of the citizens authoring this content. Through this  
 461 information, a third party can infer the identity of the author of this content. Moreover, the  
 462 extraction of a textual segment can help to track the original source (e.g., a comment) and thus  
 463 allow to a third party to link the user with the particular resource, distinguish the Social Media  
 464 user, and observe that the specific user is using the relevant Social Media capability. All the above  
 465 pose risks at the anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability and unobservability of individuals  
 466 interacting through Social Media services within the active and passive crowdsourcing method.  
 467 Finally, pseudonymity is satisfied as it can be retained as far as the Social Media platforms allow.  
 468 6. *Gap analysis*: Detailed information and guidelines concerning this step cannot be provided in a  
 469 generic form, as all the steps involved in the gap analysis stage are determined by the structure

of each organisation, and of the actions and security and privacy countermeasures it has already implemented regarding the protection of its IS and the preservation of data subjects' privacy.

7. *Data Protection Impact Assessment*: For fulfilling the objectives of this study, PIA-CNIL [45] methodology is applied (Privacy Impact Assessment, Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés), which is in accordance with the data privacy impact assessment that has been described in ISO/IEC 29134 (2017) [72], Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for privacy impact assessment. PIA-CNIL methodology consists of the following stages:

- (a) Analysis of the context of processing of personal data under consideration.
- (b) Identification of the existing or under development controls, for the satisfaction of legal requirements and the privacy risk assessment.
- (c) Assessment and evaluation of privacy risks.
- (d) Decision regarding the satisfaction of the principles related with the preservation of privacy and treatment of the identified risks.

The main goal is the identification of the assets related to the Processing Activities of personal data of e-Participation methods, as well as the identification of risks against privacy protection and the impact that can have an incident of *illegitimate access to data, unwanted modification of data, or data disappearance*. In this task, risk identification and assessment is conducted, by evaluating the likelihood of risk occurrence and the potential impact, while recommendations on appropriate strategies for risk mitigation are provided.

By applying PIA-CNIL in e-Participation methods, we have the following outcomes:

- (a) Context of personal data processing: This information has been provided in Step 4 *Mapping of data processing activities* of this Phase.
- (b) Controls: The objective of this step is to build a system that ensures compliance with privacy protection principles. So, existing controls have to be identified or determined. These controls can be organisational controls (such as organisation policy, risk management, project management, incident management, supervision, etc.), logical security controls (such as anonymisation, encryption, backups, data partitioning, logical access control, etc.), and physical security controls (such as physical access control, security of hardware, protection against non-human risk sources, etc.).
- (c) Risks: Potential privacy breaches: The objective of the third step of PIA-CNIL is to gain a good understanding of the causes of risks, the threats against privacy, as well as the impact of their potential realisation. In this step, for each of the three risk categories, i.e. *illegitimate access to data, unwanted modification of data, data disappearance*. Again, this part of DPIA cannot be provided as the risk that put the personal data the organisation processes in danger are different in every organisation, according its structure and the already applied security and privacy mechanisms.
- (d) Risk management decisions: The already existing controls are evaluated for the satisfaction of legal requirements and decisions are made whether existing controls are satisfactory. When not, an action plan is prepared and validated.

## Stage 2: Do

1. *Decisions of controls and procedures*: The organisation should plan, implement and control the processes required to meet data protection and privacy requirements, as well as to implement actions determined from the results of the previous steps of risk assessment and data protection impact assessment. According to PIA-CNIL methodology, an organisation might respond to a risk that puts in danger the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in one of the following ways: a) avoidance of the processing, b) confrontation of risk with the application of corresponding controls that minimise either the likelihood of appearance or the severity of the risk, and c) the acceptance of the risk.

- 519 2. *Implementation of controls*: The protection of personal data and privacy can be improved and  
520 enhanced by designing IT systems that reduce the degree of intrusion into the data subjects'  
521 privacy by focusing on the provision of efficient privacy process patterns [73,74].
- 522 3. *Documentation management*: The organisation should keep documented information to the extent  
523 that the processes have been carried out as planned. A four-level approach is proposed regarding  
524 the types of documents that should be kept. In the lower level the organisation keeps any records  
525 in order to provide objective evidence of compliance with the GDPR requirements. In the third  
526 level are any worksheets, forms, checklists, etc. that describe in detail how the tasks and activities  
527 are conducted. In the second level we have the description of the security process, controls and  
528 procedures and in the first level we have the governance framework description, such as policies,  
529 the scope of the organisation and other strategic documents.
- 530 4. *Communication*: The data protection objectives that the organisation sets can be used as a basis for  
531 an effective communication strategy. It is worth noting that when establishing the data protection  
532 communication objectives, they should be aligned with organisation's business communication  
533 policy, taking into account the view of internal and external interested parties, and that they are  
534 consistent with the communication principles. Indicative communication approaches and tools  
535 are the website of the organisation, newspaper articles, surveys, reports, press releases, brochures  
536 and newsletters, advertisements, workshops and conferences, posters, public meetings, media  
537 interviews, emails, focus groups, and presentations to groups.
- 538 5. *Awareness and training*: A planned and systematic training process can greatly help the  
539 organisation to improve its capabilities and to meet its data protection objectives. The appropriate  
540 involvement of personnel who are in the process of developing skills may result in personnel  
541 feeling a greater sense of ownership of the process, which makes them assume more responsibility  
542 for ensuring its success. The organisation's data protection and training policies, information  
543 security management requirements, resource management, and process design should be  
544 considered when initiating training to ensure that the required training will be directed towards  
545 satisfying the organisation's needs. According to [75], when training is selected as the solution to  
546 close the competency gap, training requirements should be specified and documented. Potential  
547 training methods are the workshops, distance learning, self-training, on-the-job coaching,  
548 apprenticeships, and course on-site or off-site.

549 The awareness programme allows an organisation to raise awareness, to ensure consistency in  
550 information security and data protection practices, and to contribute to the dissemination and  
551 implementation of policies, guidelines and procedures.

### 552 **Stage 3: Check**

- 553 1. *Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation*: In order to have confidence that the GDPR  
554 and the suggested controls are implemented efficiently, it is recommended that the organisation  
555 should determine the controls that have to be measured and monitored, as well as the responsible  
556 for this process. The best practice is to focus monitoring and measurement on the activities that  
557 are linked to the critical processes that enable the organisation to achieve its data protection  
558 objectives and targets. Examples of such objectives are measuring incidents (e.g., the percentage  
559 of false alarms through an event detection, the average cost of an incident), training activities (e.g.,  
560 the percentage of staff who have receiving training and qualifications, the number of hours of  
561 training by employees), vulnerabilities (e.g., the percentage of systems tested for vulnerabilities  
562 in a period of time) and nonconformities (e.g., the percentage of nonconformity not corrected in  
563 the predetermined time, the average required time to fix a nonconformity).
- 564 2. *Internal audit*: Audit refers to the evaluation based on facts. This kind of evaluation is conducted  
565 to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the audited organisation or system. Audit results  
566 are communicated to management who will then take the required and appropriate measures.  
567 In the context of the application of the GDPR, the objectives of the internal audit should be



568 focused on assessing and providing compliance on the best practices of the requirements of the  
569 Regulation. The outcome of the audit process should cover the following:

- 570 ● Data governance and accountability of the organisation
- 571 ● Privacy notices
- 572 ● Potential breach notification
- 573 ● Data processors and international transfers (if any)
- 574 ● Lawfulness of processing and consent management
- 575 ● Satisfaction of data subjects' rights
- 576 ● Applied security measures appropriate to the risks involved with the processing of personal  
577 data
- 578 ● Implementation of privacy by design and by default principles on systems and processes  
579 offered by the organisation

#### 580 **Stage 4: Act**

- 581 1. *Identification of potential data breaches:* Organisations should establish procedures to ensure that  
582 no personal data breaches occur. Any potential breach should be reported to the corresponding  
583 Data Protection Authority (DPA). In order for an organisation to be able to report the breach  
584 *without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it* they  
585 should have already develop clear policies, they should have determine establish procedures  
586 and best practices and they should have developed procedures regarding the notification both of  
587 the DPA and the data subjects, if necessary (Article 34, GDPR).
- 588 2. *Corrective actions:* These actions should be taken to eliminate once and for all the root causes  
589 of a nonconforminty or of any other existing undesirable event and to prevent its reoccurrence.  
590 The organisation should determine the actions necessary to eliminate the potential causes of  
591 nonconformity in accordance with the conditions of the GDPR.
- 592 3. *Continual improvement:* The GDPR programme needs to be maintained and updated periodically.  
593 During the continual improvement phase, the processes and procedures undergo frequent  
594 changes because of shifting business needs, technology upgrades, or new internal or external  
595 policies. Therefore, it is essential that the process is reviewed and updated regularly as part of  
596 the organisation's change management process to ensure that new information is documented  
597 and appropriate controls are revised.

## 598 **6. Conclusions**

599 Successful completion of a GDPR project in any organisation is a challenging issue, demanding a  
600 lot of effort by the corresponding stakeholders. However, it is imperative for all organisations, public  
601 and private ones, to be compliant with the Regulation, in order to protect the personal information they  
602 process. In the algorithmic society, where services are personalised, where worldwide communication  
603 has become trivial, and decisions are taken based on processing outcomes, and with respect to the  
604 principles of fairness and transparency, it is of growing importance for organisations to, at least, inform  
605 data subjects regarding their processing activities. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to  
606 the legal ground of each processing activity. When it is based on consent, the user should be able to  
607 withdraw it easily at any time. This obliges the data controller to stop the processing if there is no other  
608 legal ground to justify this processing. The conditions for consent are strengthened as the consent  
609 will be valid only if it has been freely given, specific informed, affirmative and unambiguous (GDPR,  
610 Article 7).

611 The results of this paper provide new contributions for researchers and practitioners as follows.  
612 The main findings regard to organisations conducting e-participation activities. First of all, public  
613 administrations undergoing GDPR assessments, should include the organisation of the e-participation  
614 initiatives among their data processing activities and thus maintain this record. Next, the consent  
615 should be obtained to provide legitimate basis for processing citizens' data. The media or tool used  
616 for acquiring and processing citizens data determines the type of required consent. E-participation

617 practitioners can follow the steps that we propose and assess the readiness of their organisation, based  
 618 on the processing activities they conduct to raise public engagement, the platform that they use to  
 619 exchange content with citizens and the personal data they process. It is worth noting that the type  
 620 of data each organisation processes determines the level of risk the organisation faces regarding the  
 621 preservation of individuals' privacy.

622 Future directions of this work include the practical evaluation of indicative platforms from each  
 623 of the three examined crowdsourcing methods, in order to reveal the peculiarities of each process. By  
 624 engaging relevant stakeholders, we will be able to further examine any additional privacy requirements  
 625 that these systems or in general e-participation platforms have. Moreover, we are planning to extend  
 626 our work by analysing each ecosystem both from security and from privacy requirements perspective,  
 627 in order to be able to identify potential threats that these systems have, any vulnerabilities that might  
 628 have impact on the resources of the system, and finally be able to propose specific countermeasure in  
 629 order to mitigate such risks.

### 630 Author Contributions:

631 Vasiliki Diamantopoulou and Aggeliki Androutopoulou conceived of the presented idea and  
 632 designed the study. Vasiliki Diamantopoulou investigated the General Data Protection Regulation  
 633 and formulated the methodology to be followed in order for an organisation to reach compliance  
 634 with the Regulation. Aggeliki Androutopoulou developed the theoretical background regarding the  
 635 e-Participation methods and investigated the exposed data that must be protected. Stefanos Gritzalis  
 636 contributed to the design of the applied methodology. Stefanos Gritzalis and Yannis Charalabidis were  
 637 involved in the planning and supervised the work.

### 638 Abbreviations

639 The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:

640	EU	European Union
	GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
	PDCA	Plan - Do - Check - Act
	DPIA	Data Protection Impact Assessment
641	API	Application Programming Interface
	DPO	Data Protection Officer
	PIA-CNIL	Privacy Impact Assessment Methodology released by the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL)
	DPA	Data Protection Authority

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